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Introduction
A tractable model of the optimal carbon tax has been put forward by Golosov et al. (2014) based on a decadal Ramsey growth model and been extended by Hassler and Krusell (2012) , Gerlagh and Liski (2012) and Iverson (2013) . This model has logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production, 100% depreciation each period, exponential damages, and zero capital intensity of fossil fuel extraction.
These are heroic conditions and necessitate a coarse calibration grid, but with them it can be shown that the social cost of carbon (SCC) is proportional to current GDP and independent of technology.
We evaluate the robustness of this simple formula in a more general Ramsey growth model with CES production and CES utility, stock-dependent extraction costs, partial depreciation and more convex climate damages, which allows for endogenous energy transition times and untapped fossil fuel reserves.
Ramsey growth and energy transitions
Let social welfare be utilitarian, with per capita utility U depending on per capita consumption / , t t C L where t L is total population (exogenous) and ρ the rate of time preference:
(1)
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals η. The ethics of climate policy depend on the weight given to future generations (and thus on how small ρ is) and on how small intergenerational inequality aversion is or how difficult it is to substitute current for future consumption per head (how low 1/η is).
Optimal climate policy faces some constraints governing the global economy. First, output at time t, ( , , , ) t t t t Z K L F R , is produced using capital K t , labor, L t , fossil fuels (e.g., oil, natural gas and coal), F t , and renewables (e.g., solar or wind energy), R t . We allow for imperfect factor substitution, so both fossil fuel and renewable energy are essential in production. Fossil fuel extraction costs, ( ) t t G S F , rise as reserves, S t , fall, G′ < 0. Renewable energy is supplied infinitely elastically at exogenously decreasing cost, b t . Technical progress increases productivity in both aggregate and renewable energy production. Climate damages curb output and are captured by the factor 1 ( ), ' 0.
net of costs of energy production and climate damage is allocated to consumption C t , investments in manmade capital and depreciation with δ the rate of depreciation: 
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The dynamics of fossil fuel reserves are: 
where ϕ L denotes the fraction of emissions that stays permanently in the atmosphere, ϕ the speed at which the temporary stock of carbon decays, and ϕ 0 a coefficient to calibrate how much of carbon is returned to the surface of the oceans and earth within a decade. We define temperature, T t , as deviations from pre-industrial temperature in degrees Celcius. The climate sensitivity, , ω corresponds to the rise in temperature ensuing from a doubling of the total stock of carbon in the atmosphere, E t :
. This formulation ignores lags between atmospheric carbon and global warming and the improvements that result from a three-stock carbon cycle, but with these features one can still obtain the linear formula for the SCC (Gerlagh and Liski, 2012 ).
The social planner maximizes (1) subject to (2)-(6). The Lagrangian reads as follows: 
where λ t denotes the shadow value of capital, ν 1t and ν 2t the shadow disvalue of the permanent and transient stocks of atmospheric carbon, and µ t the shadow value of in-situ fossil fuel. The efficiency conditions for a social optimum are (appendix A):
. Golosov et al., 2014) , because the ratios of the future capital stock and aggregate consumption to GDP are constant, namely
with α the share of capital in value added (appendix B).
Policy Simulation and Optimization
In our simulations time runs from 2010 till 2600 and is measured in decades, t = 0,1,.., 59, so period 0 corresponds to 2010-2020, period 1 to 2020-2030, etc. The final time period is t = 59 or 2600-2610, but we focus on the transitional dynamics in the earlier parts of the simulation. 1 The functional forms and benchmark parameters of our model are discussed in appendix C. We report in table 1 and figure 1 full simulation results for: (i) the general model with the SCC set to (11), (ii) the general model with the SCC set to (11′); (iii) the general model with the SCC set to zero ("laissez faire"); and (iv) the simplified model (see end of section 2) with the SCC set to (11′).
1 In simulating the model of Golosov et al (2014) we extend the horizon by 1000 years till 3600 (max t = 159) due to the transitional dynamics' strong dependence on terminal conditions, most notably asymptotic in situ depletion lim ς→∞ S ς =0.
The first-best outcomes in the general and simplified IAM's, (i) and (iv), correspond to the solid green and long-dashed blue lines in figure 1, respectively. The forecasts of transitional booms in productivity and population lead to sustained growth in consumption, output, and the capital stock over the next two centuries (as depicted in first, second and third panels in fig.1 ). In the general IAM the social optimum involves a period of initial fossil fuel use which is phased out halfway this century. After this switch point, energy is supplied from renewable sources. Optimal climate policy limits global warming to 2.3°C above pre-industrial temperature and is implemented through a rapidly rising carbon tax which flattens out and falls as economic growth and emissions taper off and decay of atmospheric carbon starts to dominate. 2 Under positive discounting, the fossil fuel extraction decreases by the discount factor but technical progress in both energy sectors sustains rising energy production. The absence of extraction costs implies asymptotic depletion of all in situ sources (4,000 GtC) and translates into high degrees of global warming of up to 4.8°C (which translate into a loss in output of mere 3.3%). In contrast, in the general IAM with extraction costs cumulative 700 GtC are burnt and 3,300 GtC is locked up in situ.
The missing carbon tax under "laissez faire" leads to inefficient allocation of resources with excessive fossil fuel extraction and high global warming damages. This lowers welfare by 17% of today's GDP because it keeps consumption low in early periods of the program to allow for capital accumulation and consumption low in future periods due to high global warming of up to 4.3°C. Under "laissez faire" decarbonisation is delayed until the next century and cumulative emissions are three times the social optimum (2,100 GtC).
2 The absence of extraction costs in the model of Golosov et al. (2014) required us to keep their assumption of limited (unit) substitutability between fossil and renewable energy sources. Infinite elasticity would imply an unrealistically high initial extraction level and rapid extraction path. The short-dashed blue dashed lines in fig. 1 corresond to scenario (iv) and uses the SCC of the simplified model (11′) in the more general IAM. While the SCC is rising too slowly, the approximation is able to internalize the climate externality sufficiently to limit global warming to 2.8°C and reduce the amount of carbon burnt to 1,000 GtC. The policy error in using a proportional policy rule is small, since the welfare loss relative to the first best is only 1% of today's GDP compared with 17% under "laissez faire".
Robustness of the optimal social cost of carbon
Figure 3 reports some robustness exercises, all of which suggest that setting the SCC according to (11′) is a poor approximation to the optimal SCC. The simple formula for the SCC is non-optimal and induces almost 50% more fossil fuel to be burnt relative to the first best (see table 1 ) and more severe climate change. (ii) SCC/Consumption A higher (lower) social rate of discount ρ leads to a less (more) ambitious climate policy with a lower (higher) SCC, later (earlier) phasing in of renewables and less (more) fossil fuel is left in situ. A higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution η corresponds to a lower coefficient of intergenerational inequality aversion (which was set to 2 in the baseline scenario) which implies that the SCC hurts earlier generations much more than later generations. Since the economy is growing, the social planner is relatively more concerned with fighting global warming than with avoiding big differences in consumption of different generations. A higher elasticity of substitution between energy and the capital-labor aggregate, , ϑ makes energy demand more sensitive to change in the relative costs of energy. This implies that the economy uses less energy and leaves more fossil fuel in situ which lowers the social cost of carbon. Under Leontief production, more fossil fuel is used but the economy switches to renewable energy earlier.
Conclusion
The SCC is not well described by a constant proportion of GDP or aggregate consumption as suggested by Golosov et al. (2014) . The correct SCC rises steeply during the initial phases of fossil fuel use as more carbon emissions push up marginal damages of global warming whilst during the carbon-free phases it falls as a proportion of GDP due to decay of the transient part of atmospheric carbon. This pattern is consistent over a broad range of key parameters. Although the SCC put forward by Golosov et al. (2014) rises too slowly, the approximation is able to internalize the climate externality sufficiently to limit global warming to 2.8°C and reduce the amount of carbon burnt to 1,000 GtC. The policy error in using the simple formula for the SCC is small: the welfare loss relative to the first best is only 1% of today's GDP compared to a loss of 17% of today's GDP under "laissez faire". The simple formula curbs global warming from 4.3 °C under "laissez faire" to 2.8 °C , which is not far from the first best which curbs temperature to 2.3 °C. Although the simple formula induces sub-optimal energy transition times and amounts of untapped fossil fuel, we conclude that a policy approximating the SCC closely is able to avoid the most deleterious damages and is thus a lot better than doing nothing. 
Appendix A: Necessary optimality conditions for the general model
Necessary conditions for a social optimum are: (1 ) '( ) , 
. Equations (A.4) and (A.5) give (10). Finally, using (A.6), (A. 7) and (A.4), the SCC, defined in final good units, can be found to equal (11).
Appendix B: Necessary optimality conditions for the simple model
We use a version of Golosov et al. (2014) which conflates coal, oil and natural gas into one fossil fuel source, F t . The SCC is derived assuming that ( / ) ln( / ) 
Maximizing with respect to the permanent and transient stocks of atmospheric carbon, we get .
Making use of (B.2) and (B.3a) and (B3b) we get the SCC,
SCC is thus proportional to world GDP (usual output after damage). The SCC as fraction of GDP is higher if society is more patient (lower ρ), damages are more sensitive to the stock of atmospheric carbon (higher γ), the temporary component of atmospheric carbon decays more quickly (higher ϕ), and population growth is bigger. If all carbon stays in the atmosphere forever (ϕ = 1), equation (11′) simplifies to
Since global warming is the only market failure, the social optimum can be realized in a market economy by setting the optimal carbon tax exactly equal to the SCC and refunding the revenues in a lump-sum fashion to the private sector.
Maximizing with respect to F t , and R t yields Since extraction costs of fossil fuel do not become infinitely large as oil and gas reserves vanish, the optimum is characterized by asymptotic depletion of these reserves.
The "laissez-faire" outcome does not internalize climate externalities and thus corresponds to a zero carbon tax, τ t = 0. It follows from (B.4) and (B.5) that 
Abstracting from extraction costs of oil and gas (A Ft → ∞), supposing a Cobb-Douglas production for the energy aggregate (χ → 0), abstracting from technological progress in renewable energy production (A Rt → A R ), we get 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) . 
so that extraction of oil and gas occurs more rapidly if the discount rate is high and population growth is small. For any given current rate of oil extraction the rate of future oil extraction is higher in the social optimum than under "laissez faire". Hence, the former postpones oil extraction and carbon emissions compared to "laissez faire", especially if carbon decay is slow and society is patient (small ϕ, low ρ).
Appendix C: Functional forms, calibration and computational implementation
In the simulations we use iso-elastic utility function
We set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to η = ½ and thus intergenerational inequality aversion to 2. The pure rate of time preference ρ is set to 10% per decade which corresponds to 0.96% per year.
We employ an extraction technology of the form . This calibration is done for a Leontief technology. We assume that for a more general technology the same parameter values can be applied. Our calibration assumes that renewable energy is initially very expensive and falls to current levels only in the very long run. This, together with the assumption about fossil energy, biases the model against rapid de-carbonization.
The initial capital stock is set to 200 (US$ trillion), which is taken from Rezai and van der Ploeg (2013) . We set δ to be 0.5 per decade, which corresponds to a yearly depreciation rate of 6.7%.
Population in 2010 (L 1 ) is 6.5 billion people. Following Nordhaus (2008) 
A5
Output before damages is ( )
and 0 1. β < < This is a constant-returns-to scale CES production function in energy and a capitallabor composite with ϑ the elasticity of substitution, β the share the parameter for energy, and σ the carbon intensity of output. The capital-labor composite is defined by a constant-returns-to-scale CobbDouglas function with α the share of capital, A total factor productivity and L t A the efficiency of labor.
The two types of energy are perfect substitutes in production. Damages are calibrated so that they give the same climate damages for the initial levels of output and mean temperature. It is convenient to rewrite production before damages as
We set the share of capital to α = 0.35, the energy share parameter to β = 0.05, and the elasticity of Nordhaus (2008) 
Computational implementation
The transversality condition for the model is turnpike property renders terminal conditions essentially unimportant. We allow for continuation stocks to reduce the impact of the terminal condition on the transitions paths in the early periods of the program. We use the computer program GAMS and its optimization solver CONOPT3 to solve the model numerically. The social planner optimum in which the externality is taken into account fit the program structure readily. To solve for the "laissez faire" equilibrium paths, we adopt the iterative approach discussed in detail in Rezai (2011) . Briefly, to approximate the externality scenario, the aggregate economy is fragmented into N dynasties. Each dynasty has 1/Nth of the initial endowments and chooses consumption, investment and energy use in order to maximize the discounted total utility of per capita consumption. The dynasties understand the contribution of their own emissions to the climate change, but take carbon emissions of others as given. The climate dynamics are affected by the decisions of all dynasties. This constitutes the market failure.
It might seem easier to simply assume that there is one dynasty that ignores the externality but this would not be a rational expectation equilibrium. The externality problem is not an optimization but an equilibrium problem. The CONOPT3 solver of GAMS is powerful in solving maximization problems and it is more efficient to adopt an iterative routine in which a planner of a fragmented economy solves an optimization problem representatively than to attempt solving the equilibrium conditions directly. Given our specifications, the computation of the equilibrium problem takes less than one minute. To introduce this approximate externality, we make the following adjustments to the initial faire" the planner only adjusts her controls to take into account the effects of her own decisions (i.e.
1/Nth of the climate externality). If 1 N = the externality is internalized and we obtain the social optimum. As N → ∞ , we obtain the "laissez faire" outcome characterized in section 2.
Following Rezai (2011) , the numerical routine starts by assuming a time path of emissions exogenous to the dynasty's optimization, We set = 400 to account for the fact that in the present world economy, the externality in the market of GHG emissions is already internalized to a very small extent through the imposition of carbon taxes or tradable emission permits and non-market regulation (e.g. through the Kyoto Protocol or the establishment of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme). In our "laissez faire"
simulations, the dynastic planner takes into account less than 0.25% of global emissions.
